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“Regulating Digital Platforms”
In this issue we pursue our exploration of whether and how digital 
platforms, especially digital platforms as applied to the network 
industries, should and could be regulated. Indeed, as of recently, 
attention paid to these emerging digital platforms is exploding. Most 
of the related publications aim at making recommendations as to 
whether, and if yes, how to regulate these digital platforms in the 
interest of the consumer, the citizen, the public economy and even 
public values. Some of these recommendations may be drawn quite 
hastily, triggered by scandals and other (geo-)political considerations.
The four contributing authors, all professors, will take a step back 
and look at where we stand in terms of the more academic debate 
on digital platforms, especially on these platforms that clearly have 
public (service) implications. In turn, they will apply economic, 
competition, legal and political perspectives on the regulation of 
digital platforms and try to derive from there the current state of the 
debate. In particular, they want to crystalize what we already know – 
and therefore have sufficient reasons to regulate – and what we do not 
know yet. 
In short, this issue should serve as another contribution to the current 
debate about the regulation of digital platforms, in particular digital 
platforms applied to infrastructures and public services.
This special issue opens with an article by Montero, who analyses the 
regulation of a new model of industrial organisation, which should be 
built on the understanding of the role of platforms as intermediaries, 
on a massive scale, with the power to coordinate markets without 
owning the assets for the provision of services.
Köksal summarises the current EU and US approaches towards the 
digital platforms, and then underlines two challenging areas in which 
competition policy tools should be actively applied.
Finger analyses the algorithms platforms use to constantly increase 
their market power. By doing so, platforms, thanks to their algorithms, 
make choices on behalf of their customers – choices that are of a 
public policy nature. Finger discovers, should platforms and/or their 
underlying algorithms be regulated, and if so, how?
Chakravorty examines how economists view digital platforms as 
digital markets with an intermediary platform and then considers 
some studies that discuss the general challenges in regulating digital 
platforms. 
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Digital Platforms vs. Large-Scale Firms: Regulating a New Mo-
del of Industrial Organisation
Juan José Montero*
As technology reduces transaction costs, digital platforms are creating a new industrial organisation model to coordinate economic actors. This 
new model is in competition with the hierarchical coordination inside large-scale firms. The regulation adopted over the last century for large-
scale integrated firms cannot be automatically extended to platforms. Regulation should be built on the understanding of the role of platforms as 
intermediaries, on a massive scale, with the power to coordinate markets without owning the assets for the provision of services.
The large-scale firm
The Industrial Revolution substituted the tradi-tional agrarian society of small producers and lo-cal markets by large-scale firms and first national 
and later global markets. New technology empowered this 
transformation. Industrial production, with new energy 
forms, created economies of scale in production, ensuring 
industrial production a competitive advantage. Railways, 
steamships, the telegraph and the telephone enlarged mar-
kets from local to national, aggregating demand for large-
scale production.
The firm was at the center of this transformation. Econo-
mists identified the role of the firm as a system coordinator. 
In 1937’s “The Nature of the Firm”, one of the most quot-
ed economic papers in history, Ronald Coase explained 
that the “entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs produc-
tion” substitutes within the firm the price movements that 
direct production outside the firm (p. 388). The reason for 
this substitution is the high transaction costs in the mar-
ket, which are mostly linked to poor information and un-
certainty. The higher the transaction costs in the market, 
the larger the production that would be integrated/coordi-
nated within the firm, and the larger the firm would turn. 
Transaction costs were identified as the reason for firms to 
exist.
Large-scale firms coordinate the necessary assets: capital, 
technology, human resources, distribution networks, etc. 
Coordination is executed by integrating the assets verti-
cally into a single entity under the hierarchical control of 
the entrepreneur/manager. Again, technology makes this 
coordination possible (communications, transport, media, 
etc.).
The technology that empowers large-scale firms actually 
was coordinated by large-scale firms, which often adopt-
ed the form of a monopoly: AT&T for telephony, GE 
for electricity, railways, etc. The network industries in the 
United States were a good example of the coordinating role 
of the entrepreneur substituting market coordination. 
Regulation was adopted to foster industrialisation. The 
same corporations were made possible by the authorisation 
to create legal persons and the adoption of sophisticated 
legislation to govern them. Capital accumulation was facil-
itated by new legislation on banking and stock exchanges, 
etc.
Regulation was later adopted to govern the negative ef-
fects of industrial firms; this included antitrust rules to 
protect competition, economic regulation to control mo-
nopolistic network industries, labor laws to govern the 
relationships between firms and workers, and consumer 
protection legislation.
This model has been taken to the extreme over the last 
decades. Globalisation has created the largest of the mar-
kets, rewarding firms that exhaust economies of scale. The 
pursuit of scale has produced behemoths that dominate 
industry after industry: larger industrial production plants 
(often in China), larger shipping companies operating the 
largest container-ships ever, larger financial institutions, 
larger media groups, and so on.
Technology and transaction costs
However, this trend might be turning. For decades, 
large-scale firm have been increasingly outsourcing pro-
duction. Demand for ever-larger aircrafts and vessels is 
slowing. Large transnational acquisitions for the creation 
of global communications, electricity, or transport groups 
are increasingly exceptional. Certainly, there might be al-
ternative explanations for many of these evolutions, but 
technology that reduces transactions costs and reduces the 
competitiveness of large-scale firms might be behind this 
new trend.
Information and communication technology (ICT) has 
dramatically reduced transaction costs over the last 20 
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years. Some of the more relevant transaction costs are re-
lated to search and management of information related to 
the counterparty, the product, the transaction itself or the 
execution of the transaction. Communication costs are 
also relevant. The development of the internet has made 
information available at a previously unknown scale. The 
new communications technology (mobile networks, data 
communications services, voice over the internet, etc.) 
has made the information ubiquitous at a very low cost. 
Finally, computing has reduced the cost of managing the 
massive amount of available information. The next step is 
the automation of more and more transactions. The full 
deployment of ICT and the increasing application of ar-
tificial intelligence are substituting human intervention 
in many commercial (and non-commercial) transactions. 
Automation will have a strong effect on transaction costs.
In Coase’s terms, technology has the power to reduce the 
cost of coordination in the market, making it more effi-
cient than internal coordination inside the firm. Coordina-
tion of the transactions in the market is precisely the ambi-
tion of the digital platforms. Platforms have the ability to 
fully exploit technology to reduce transaction costs, which 
is why they are in competition with the large-scale firms, 
the institution exploiting internal coordination.
Digital platforms
Digital platforms coordinating multi-sided markets are 
the new model of industrial organisation empowered by 
technology. Multi-sided markets typically involve two or 
more distinct types of users, interacting through a third 
party, the platform. This model was identified by Rochet 
and Tirole in their seminal paper “Platform Competition 
in Two-Sided Markets”. The new paradigm built by Ro-
chet and Tirole has spawned a substantial amount of in-
dustrial organisation literature (Evans et al., 2016; Parker 
et al. 2016).
Multi-sided markets typically involve two or more dis-
tinct types of users that interact through a third party, the 
platform. Positive network effects (both direct and indi-
rect) are key. The larger the ecosystem, the larger the net-
work effects. Platforms are central to this new model of 
industrial organisation. Firstly, they are the entities that use 
the technology to reduce transaction costs. Apps make use 
of the internet to reduce communication costs to almost 
zero, use algorithms to match supply and demand, and 
provide information about the counterparties (ranking, 
likes, etc.). Secondly, they invest in growing the ecosystem 
around them to reach the positive network effects. Third-
ly, they coordinate the market place, setting the standards, 
the rules and the distribution across the ecosystem of the 
benefits created by the network effects.
Scale can now be built by coordinating the assets pro-
vided by third parties, many of which are small providers. 
Large-scale firms have now an alternative. Digital plat-
forms can rapidly pull together more assets than individual 
firms; for example, Airbnb provides access to more rooms 
than any hotel chain.
In Coase’s terms, technology has reduced transaction 
costs, which has meant that coordination in the market 
can become more efficient than coordination by the en-
trepreneur inside the firm. Furthermore, technology has 
empowered a new form of coordination in the market. The 
market is not only the traditional direct relationship be-
tween supply and demand. Transaction costs are reduced 
as a new intermediary – the digital platform – coordinates 
supply and demand in the most efficient manner. The plat-
form becomes the market coordinator.
Competition between two models of industrial organ-
isation
As platforms emerge across industries, two models of in-
dustrial organisation compete with each other: platforms 
and large-scale firms. Accommodation has already been 
given as an example, but the trend can be identified at a 
much broader scale.
Media has shown how platforms coordinating third par-
ties (Facebook and YouTube are the prime examples) can 
compete with well-established traditional media empires 
and outnumber them, both in viewership scale and adver-
tisement revenue. Traditional newspapers and broadcasters 
are increasingly being intermediated by platforms. Viewers 
tend to have their access to individual news-pieces filtered 
and proposed to them by the platforms. Digital platforms 
are becoming the coordinators of the media market. Tra-
ditional media companies are increasingly working for the 
platforms’ algorithms.
Transport also shows the capacity of platforms to create 
networks on top of distributed systems such as private cars. 
For example, Uber coordinates a fleet of around 3 million 
vehicles/drivers, and it is starting to pull together different 
transport modes (cars, scooters, and mass-transit) and ex-
panding from passenger transportation into food delivery 
and freight transportation. Digital platforms aim to coor-
dinate trucks, vessels and aircrafts, in competition with the 
well-established behemoths in the maritime and aviation 
industries. Again, traditional transport providers are in-
creasingly working for the algorithms that coordinate the 
competing transport modes/services.
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 21 | N°4 | December 2019              4
dossier
As Google CEO Eric Schmidt said, “One very compel-
ling – and underappreciated – aspect of the internet is how 
it has greatly expanded the potential to build platforms 
not just in the technology business, but in any industry” 
(Schmidt 2014, p. 81). Any industry can be disrupted by 
platforms coordinating third-party assets at a previously 
unknown scale, with unknown efficiency.
Are large accommodation, media, transport, or finance 
firms even necessary in a new world of digital platforms 
coordinating small firm’s (and even individually owned) 
rooms, news-pieces, rides, and finance transactions?
Regulating digital platforms
Just as a new legal framework was built for large-scale 
firms and the industrial world, a new legal framework is 
necessary for the new model of industrial organisation 
emerging around digital platforms. The legal rules de-
signed for the large-scale firm cannot be automatically ap-
plied to the platforms, just as the old feudal rules were an 
obstacle to industrialisation and did not solve the challeng-
es it posed to workers, consumers, and the environment.
Traditional legislation on labor, liability, antitrust, con-
sumer protection, etc. was designed for large-scale firms 
that were in full control of their assets, as they were inter-
nalised and under the hierarchical control of the entrepre-
neur/manager.
Digital platforms do not have such control over the as-
sets they coordinate. They do not own the assets they co-
ordinate (rooms, vehicles, etc.). They do not employ the 
individuals providing assets and services (drivers, home 
owners, etc.) under labor law. 
Digital platforms are intermediaries. They use technol-
ogy to facilitate the interaction between third parties. It 
can be the interaction among businesses (B2B), between 
business and consumers (B2C), or even between busi-
nesses and government (B2G). Intermediation is prone to 
conflicts of interest. This is why intermediaries often have 
codes of conduct and are sometimes subject to regulation. 
Transparency is often a requirement to avoid conflict of 
interests. Non-discrimination rules are common among 
intermediaries. These are the principles that should inspire 
platform regulation.
However, the scale and market power of the new interme-
diaries have no precedent. The largest platforms coordinate 
literally billions of users across the world. It is not only a 
scale. Platforms are growing increasingly powerful in the 
markets they intermediate. Network effects lead to market 
concentration. Platforms tend to evolve into tight oligop-
olies and even monopolies (winner-take-all). Such concen-
tration reinforces the role of the platform as system coor-
dinator. They do not merely create network effects across 
their ecosystem, but they decide how the ecosystem works, 
who is accepted into it, and how the benefits derived from 
network effects are distributed across the ecosystem.
Digital platforms challenge the existing regulation. Li-
ability for the provision of services intermediated by the 
platform is a challenge. Full liability for the intermediated 
service is not usually required of intermediaries. However, 
in an automatically intermediated transaction, consumers 
might not even recognize that an intermediary has inter-
vened. They often think it is the platform that is providing 
the service. In fact, the stronger the coordination role of 
the platforms, the more confusing it is for the consumer. 
At the same time, imposing full liability on the platform 
would ignore the fact that platforms do not own the assets 
and that service providers are not under the hierarchical 
control of the platform. Furthermore, full liability could 
be a fundamental obstacle for the platform to grow the 
massive ecosystem around them and reach the efficiencies, 
damaging consumers and society as a whole.
For example, antitrust faces fundamental difficulties to 
define the relevant market. Platforms work across markets. 
The more traditional markets they coordinate, the larger 
the network effects and the larger the benefits. It is diffi-
cult to model such complex structures to identify the harm 
in a merger or in an abuse of dominant position case, or 
to identify potentially anticompetitive vertical agreements 
between the platform and the intermediated firms.
Labor law is another example of a regulation adopted for 
the large-scale firm that cannot be automatically extended 
to digital platforms. Small service providers are not under 
the hierarchical control of the platform as they are under 
the control of the traditional firm. Service providers are 
usually free to work with several platforms at the same time 
(multi-homing); they decide when they want to work, and 
they are free to take many decision on how they provide 
their services. They usually have the direct contractual rela-
tionship with the consumer. Again, automatically extend-
ing the labor regulation to platforms could just delay or 
hinder the construction of the network effects that create 
the efficiencies for the benefit of the consumers and society 
as a whole.
Does this mean that digital platforms should not be reg-
ulated? Not at all! Digital platforms can harm producers, 
particularly individual workers, consumers, and society in 
many new forms. But regulation must be adapted to the 
new reality. Regulation should start with the acknowledge-
ment that platforms create massive efficiencies that cannot 
be ignored or shunned if a society wants to remain com-
petitive. Regulation must then be adapted to the new real-
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ity and to the structure of the new industrial organisation 
model.
First, the regulation of the digital platforms should be 
built on the recognition that platforms intermediate be-
tween third parties. Platforms are built on billions of 
contractual relationships with producers, consumers, ad-
vertisers, etc. Regulation should focus on these contrac-
tual relationships, and particularly on the algorithms that 
enforce such contracts. Algorithms should be more trans-
parent, so the intermediate parties are aware of potential 
conflicts of interests. It is important to understand why 
and how service providers are selected by the algorithm 
against a competitor. This is particularly the case when the 
platform is vertically integrated and not only intermedi-
ates, but also competes in the provision of the service. 
Second, the vertical contractual relationships between 
service providers and platforms are key. As the economy is 
“platformised” (transformed into multi-sided markets co-
ordinated by a platform), individual service providers get 
“platformed”, their services commodified and their posi-
tion against the platform weakened. The financial sustain-
ability of underlying service providers must be protected, 
both in the case of individuals but also in case of infra-
structure managers (Montero & Finger, 2017).
Third, the market power of the most successful platforms 
relies on network effects. The regulation of such market 
position should be inspired by the experience of the regula-
tion of the traditional network industries over the last cen-
tury: unbundling, portability, measures to reduce barriers 
to entry, access regulation are the precedents upon which 
the regulation of platforms as the new network industries 
can be built (Finger & Montero, 2018).
Fourth, on a broader scale, it is through the algorithms 
that platforms coordinate the markets around them. Al-
gorithms can have a negative impact on the intermediated 
parties, both producers and consumers. Algorithms can 
also have effects on the general interest, on the wider dy-
namics resulting from millions of interactions in the mar-
ket. The tools for regulators to ensure that the algorithms 
promote the general interest have to be designed.
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Competition Policy Towards Digital Platforms
Emin Köksal*
Among the diverse public policy tools, competition policy is commonly considered as an effective instrument with which to deal with increasing 
dominance of digital platforms. Although current competition policies towards the digital platforms on both side of the Atlantic have been evolving, 
we have not yet seen an effective approach. It will only be possible to simultaneously maintain innovation incentives and curb market power in 
platform markets by adopting a new understanding in competition policy.
Introduction
While digital platforms have increased their influence on 
our daily lives, we have encountered new innovative ser-
vices, but also faced unprecedented social and economic 
issues. Competition policy is commonly considered as an 
effective public policy tool to deal with these issues. Com-
petition policy tools have been actively used in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) to deter anticompetitive behavior of the 
platforms. In the United States, meanwhile, the political 
salience of competition policy towards the digital plat-
forms has increased progressively. In this paper, I will first 
summarise the current EU and US approaches towards the 
digital platforms, and then underline two challenging ar-
eas in which competition policy tools should be actively 
applied.
Current policies towards digital platforms 
The scale of digital platforms and their global expan-
sion has led to calls for more interventionist public pol-
icies. There are two main reasons for the rise of such a 
tendency. First, the share of the platforms in added value 
has increased at the expense of the entities that use these 
platforms to reach final consumers (Hortaçsu and Syver-
son 2015). As their share in the value-added process to 
decline, those entities call for public intervention to reverse 
it. Second, personal data retrieved by the platforms and its 
usage may potentially harm the competition in the mar-
ket (Graef 2015). In parallel with their increasing share in 
added value, the platforms use the data to consolidate their 
market power. In many countries, these two concerns have 
led to debates about the need for a more rigid competition 
policy. 
The most radical proposal has come from the US, where 
most of these platforms have originated, expressed most 
publicly by Elizabeth Warren, a potential Democratic pres-
idential candidate. She has called for regulators to break up 
digital platforms such as Facebook, Amazon, and Google. 
She has argued that reducing the scale of these platforms 
would give existing and potential competitors more op-
portunities to compete, which is more desirable in terms 
of a viable competition in the market. Moreover, Warren 
has suggested legislation that would prohibit the platforms 
from both offering a marketplace for commerce and par-
ticipating in that marketplace (see Herndon 2019).
Although such a plan may seem fair at first sight, any 
intervention under a competition policy should be based 
on legal and economic foundations. In particular, such a 
structural intervention should be supported by economic 
facts, as well as legal justifications. On academic grounds, 
scholars like Lina Khan represent an academic base for 
those kinds of regulatory plans. In her influential article, 
Khan (2016) argued that the current antitrust framework 
is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power 
in the digital economy. Khan proposed two potential ways 
to address the power of digital platforms: (1) restoring 
traditional competition policy principles, or (2) applying 
ex-ante obligations for those platforms.
A look at recent practices in the US shows that the coun-
try’s two antitrust enforcement agencies have already re-or-
ganised their workforces to deal with digital platforms. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice (DoJ) agreed on a plan to 
divide regulation of four of the country’s largest platforms. 
Under this plan, the FTC supervises Facebook and Am-
azon, while the DoJ handles Google and Apple (Kendall 
and McKinnon 2019). However, the approaches of the 
enforcement agencies are more modest than those of the 
politicians. As understood from their public explanations, 
they aim to maintain innovation incentives while curbing 
market power of the platforms (see McConnell 2019). Al-
though neither the FTC nor the DoJ has opened any cases 
yet, the attorneys-general who represent the 50 states have 
recently started a competition probe into Google’s activi-
ties in advertising and search businesses.
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On the other hand, in the EU, practice of competition 
policy has been beyond any political debate thanks to the 
European Commission’s (EC) decisions in recent years (see 
Dionnet and Zacharodimos 2019). During the past few 
years, the EC has concluded investigations against Google, 
with record fines. In 2017 it fined the company 2.42 bil-
lion EUR for abusing its dominant position by favoring 
its shopping application compared to competing shopping 
services. In 2018, the EC fined Google 4.34 billion EUR 
after it found that the platform had engaged in anticom-
petitive practices to reinforce its dominant position in 
general internet searches via licensing its mobile operating 
system Android. Finally, in 2019, the EC fined the compa-
ny 1.49 billion EUR for abusing its dominant position by 
imposing a number of restrictive clauses in contracts with 
third-party websites that prevented Google’s rivals from 
placing their search advertisements on these websites. 
Amazon is another digital platform that has been scru-
tinised by the EC. Although certain probes against Ama-
zon have been terminated by the company’s commitments 
concerning its problematic business practices, the EC is 
currently investigating Amazon’s conduct in terms of its 
dual role as a platform for retailers and as a retailer itself. 
Apple is also targeted by the EC for similar conduct. The 
EC started to examine Apple’s practices concerning its App 
Store following a complaint by music platform Spotify. 
The complaint claims that Apple is undermining Spotify’s 
competitive position, among others, through its pricing 
policy.
Although there has not yet been any investigation into 
Facebook at the EC level, the German enforcer Federal 
Cartel Office (FCO) investigated Facebook and fined the 
company for its data collection and processing policy of 
its users. The enforcer decided that Facebook’s data policy 
constitutes an abuse of dominant position on the social 
network market in the form of exploitative harm for con-
sumers.
Towards a new understanding in competition policy
Considering the aforementioned issues, one could argue 
that competition policies on both sides of the Atlantic have 
been evolving to deal with the increasing dominance of 
the digital platforms. Although the direction of the evolve-
ment is still ambiguous, it is certain that the traditional 
reasoning set out in competition policy is no longer valid 
to analyse the dynamic nature of platform industries. As 
Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole (2017) has noted, the competition 
policy towards the platforms should review its software. 
Through adopting a new understanding and implement-
ing better tools, innovation should be incentivised while 
curbing the market power of the platforms. Although there 
are various issues concerning this software update, I will 
elaborate on two of them: concentration and data.
There are two main sources of the concentration in plat-
form markets: network effects (both direct and indirect) 
and economies of scale (Tirole 2017). As the number of 
users of a platform increases, network effects initiate and 
create a feedback loop that makes this platform more at-
tractive. Thereby, more users gradually tend to use the 
platform. In addition, platform businesses usually require 
large technological investment and only become feasible 
with a high number of users. Those two factors inherently 
create entry barriers and give rise to concentrated markets 
in which a single platform usually operates as a dominant 
player. Considering this fact, limiting the size of a platform 
or rigorously breaking up a platform seems infeasible in 
economic terms. 
However, there are still two significant roles that the com-
petition policy should play. First, entry barriers should be 
decreased to allow the flourish of new ideas as disruptive 
rivals (Bethell et al. 2019). For instance, decreasing the 
switching cost of users should play a significant role in that 
sense of encouraging potential rival platforms. If users can 
be on different platforms at the same time, or they can 
easily migrate to other platforms, then potential rivals find 
it easy to enter the market. Such an approach would not 
only allow new entrants but also keep the existing players 
more innovative (Federico et al. 2019). Through closely 
monitoring the existing platforms and market conditions, 
competition enforcers may explore more factors to elimi-
nate that work as entry barriers. In order to decrease the 
monitoring costs, regulators may adopt more responsive 
complaint mechanisms. 
Second, an active merger control policy should be adopt-
ed in order to curb the concentration in platform markets. 
Currently, a merger or an acquisition must be notified to 
the relevant competition authority if the target or pur-
chaser company’s turnover exceeds certain thresholds in 
money terms. Moreover, the examination becomes critical 
only if the two companies are in the same relevant mar-
ket. However, in recent years most of the digital platforms 
have quickly expanded their businesses into diverse areas. 
For instance, Facebook acquired WhatsApp, a well-known 
messaging application, and Google acquired Nest, a smart 
home product producer. Most recently, Google planned to 
acquire Fitbit, a wearable technology producer. By acquir-
ing a company in a different market, the platform directly 
becomes a significant player in that market. Moreover, the 
data acquired via the acquisition reinforces the purchasing 
platform’s dominance in its core business. Therefore, an 
active merger policy equipped with new tools should be 
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adopted for an effective competition policy towards the 
platforms.    
Thanks to internet-related digital technologies, it has be-
come feasible to collect and process mass personal data for 
the first time in history. At every stage of our daily lives we 
produce personal data about our health condition, shop-
ping behavior, etc. Digital platforms use this data to offer 
us more targeted, innovative products. In theory there is 
nothing wrong with this. However, from the competition 
policy perspective, data collected by a dominant platform 
may be  part of exclusionary conduct to eliminate the 
threat of disruptive firms.
Having mass personal data enables platforms to offer 
innovative services and helps them gain competitive ad-
vantages. Based on this motivation, the platforms invest 
in data collection and processing technologies to innovate 
new services. Therefore, a rigid approach for data collec-
tion and processing may harm this innovative process. In 
this respect, competition policy should maintain those 
incentives and should not directly punish the platforms 
for their treatment of data. However, data owned by the 
incumbent platform may constitute an entry barrier for a 
potential rival (Tucker 2019). If a platform has a business 
strategy to exclude potential rivalry using data as an instru-
ment, then an intervention should be required unless this 
practice does not have any economic justification.
Conclusion
The above analysis clearly shows that competition poli-
cy needs an evolvement to deal with the increasing domi-
nance of the digital platforms. However, radical remedies 
like breaking up the platforms are not compatible with the 
nature of platform markets. Nonetheless, constantly fining 
the platforms for their wrong doings is not an effective way 
to ensure competition, unless it is applied as a part of a new 
approach. Maintaining innovation incentives and curbing 
market power at the same time in platform markets can 
only be achieved through adopting a new understanding 
in competition policy.
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Algorithms as Public Policy: How to Regulate Them?
Matthias Finger*
Platforms are challenging public service providers in the different network industries, as they position themselves between these providers and 
their customers/users, and also tend towards monopolies. Consequently, such platforms become something like the “new infrastructures”. As new 
infrastructures, they are able to appropriate much, if not all, of the profits, which were traditionally reinvested both in the infrastructures and 
infrastructure (public) services providers. Furthermore, platforms use increasingly sophisticated algorithms to constantly increase their market power 
(for example, winner-takes-all). By doing so, platforms, thanks to their algorithms, make choices on behalf of their customers – choices that are of a 
public policy nature. Should they and/or their underlying algorithms be regulated, and if so, how? This is the topic of this short essay.
Introduction
Digital platforms will play a growing role in the different network industries (infrastructures) in the not too distant future (Finger, 2019; Finger 
& Montero, 2017), beginning with mobility (Finger and 
Auduoin, 2018). This raises questions about the regulation 
of these digital platforms, as well as regarding whether ad-
ditional regulation is necessary if applied in the different 
infrastructures, particularly also because infrastructures are 
strongly driven by public policy objectives. This latter issue 
is the subject of this essay. However, before addressing this 
issue, I will first recall the general nature of digital plat-
forms and, in particular, the role played by algorithms as 
the key driver of their raising power. I will then discuss the 
specific public policy dimensions of infrastructures and, 
finally, explore why this specific public policy nature of 
digital platforms calls for regulation. 
Digital platforms and the power of algorithms
Digital platforms mediate between parties involved in a 
transaction, such as suppliers and buyers, along with third 
parties such as advertisers. In doing so, platforms take ad-
vantage of “digitalization”, the defining feature of which is 
its ability to significantly reduce transaction costs. The en-
suing direct and indirect network effects are known to lead 
to monopolization, a phenomenon that is also called “win-
ner-takes-it-all” (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016; Parker, 
van Alstyne and Choudary, 2016). But how exactly does 
digitalization engender such network effects or, in other 
words, lead to the “power of platforms”, both in general 
and in the case of the infrastructures?
Is data key?
There has been a lot of discussion about data being key. 
It has been argued that digital platforms owe their power 
to all the data they are sitting on (Mayer-Schönenberger 
and Cukier, 2013). Consequently, they should be forced 
(via regulation) to share them or make them “open” so that 
their monopolies can be broken, so that competitors can 
also enjoy the benefits of competition, and so that custom-
ers can take advantage of the benefits of innovation.
While data are certainly important, they are only one side 
of the coin. It is true that more data about the buyers will 
allow the platform to suggest to these same buyers more 
targeted products and services, as it will allow the platform 
to suggest to the advisers more efficient (that is, more per-
sonalized) ads. More data about the suppliers will help the 
platform better know its strengths and weaknesses (qual-
ity, delivery times, handling of complaints, etc.) and thus 
better use its strengths and weaknesses to the benefit of the 
buyers, advertisers, and of course the platforms themselves. 
Needless to say, the profits platforms make are, in essence, 
efficiency gains; in other words, there is no real value add-
ed. Platforms coordinate more efficiently than physical ac-
tors, and the so efficiency gains reflect a platform’s profits, 
at least initially. Once platforms become dominant or even 
monopolistic, they will also be able to take advantage of 
their monopoly position vis-à-vis the suppliers, the buyers 
and the third parties, and extract monopoly rents.
The following figure represents the economics of plat-
forms; that is a multi-sided market with strong network 
effects. The more buyers there are, the better it is for the 
suppliers; the more suppliers there are, the better it is for 
the buyers; the more suppliers and buyers there are on the 
platform, the better it is for the advertisers (third party); 
and the more advertisers there are, the better it is for the 
buyers and the suppliers, as products and services can be 
even subsidized by the platform. Figure 1 illustrates these 
network effects.
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Figure 1. Platform Economics




From data to algorithms
Of course, platform economics is about numbers: more 
suppliers, more buyers, more advertisers. It is also about 
datapoints: more data about suppliers, more data about 
buyers, more data about third parties. But data without 
analysis are simply junk, and that is where algorithms 
come in. Algorithms offer the possibility of an ever more 
sophisticated (that is, an increasingly anticipatory, predic-
tive, and suggestive) analysis of buyer, supplier, and third 
party behavior, ideally even in relationship to one another. 
This, in turn, increases the relative power of one platform 
vis-à-vis another (leading ultimately to a monopoly), as 
well as their extractive power over buyers, suppliers, and 
third parties (Domingos, 2015; Agrawal, Gans and Gold-
farb, 2018).
Up to a certain point, algorithms can even substitute 
data. Of course, data are needed to train algorithms, but, 
once trained, algorithms can work even with basic and 
proxy data. In other words, not all the data need to be re-
trieved from all the suppliers, buyers, and third parties all 
the time. A critical sample is often sufficient to predict the 
behavior of the different parties. In this sense, algorithms 
are key for increasing the power of platforms (vis-à-vis 
other platforms) and for extracting even higher monopoly 
rents from all the different parties to the platform.
The non-neutrality of algorithms
Algorithms are the result of the work of programmers 
who are tasked with optimizing along some objective func-
tion. Platforms (so far) are commercial undertakings; con-
sequently, programmers – and therefore platforms – are 
optimizing the tension between extraction of revenue and 
supplier, buyer and advertiser satisfaction. Amazon will 
suggest a book to a potential buyer, of whom the (pro-
grammer of the) algorithm thinks that it is most likely to 
be bought. Among all the books most likely to be bought, 
the algorithm will probably favor those from suppliers with 
whom Amazon has a better deal. To use another example, 
an online dating platform will of course suggest likeable 
potential partners, but not necessarily partners with whom 
the partner will hopelessly fall in love, never to be seen on 
the platform again.
Of course, any other objective function – such as cheap-
er books, less wasteful products, more intelligent partners, 
more considerate opinion pieces (in the case of a newsfeed) 
– could also be programmed into an algorithm instead. My 
point here is not to say that this should be done, simply 
that it could be done, as this is not a technical problem. It 
is simply a matter of objectives and of incentives. 
Currently, traditional platforms such as Amazon, Face-
book, Airbnb, booking.com, and Kayak do not typical-
ly make policy, although they do influence policy, as the 
point is now openly debated in the case of social media 
platforms. However, these platforms do have the ability to 
influence public opinion and thus policy. No matter what 
they do, they do influence behavior and thus play a poli-
cy-making role. This may not seem important in the case 
of the choice of an airline, for example, but even here one 
could argue that instead of optimizing for price and travel 
times, the platform could also optimize for less polluting 
aircraft or for airlines with a more progressive standing in 
matters of sustainability. In this way, platforms, thanks to 
their algorithms, could actually play a more active role in 
public policy. And, if they explicitly do this, should they 
be regulated? If they do not, should they be used for public 
policy-making and therefore be actively regulated as well? 
If yes, how? 
Infrastructures as public policy
While the above questions as applied to traditional (and 
commercial) platforms seem to be rather academic, the is-
sue is much more real in the case of infrastructures, and 
this is where I want to turn to now. Let me do this in two 
steps by using two examples – Uber and MaaS (mobili-
ty-as-a-service) – before generalizing the argument to plat-
forms in infrastructures more generally. The reasons why I 
selected and MaaS are mainly pedagogical, as both exam-
ples perfectly illustrate the argument I am trying to make.
Uber
Uber, or any other ride-hailing provider for that matter 
(Lyft, blablacar, etc.), is a platform that mediates between 
a driver and a customer/user. For the customers, it is pri-
marily a substitute for a taxi service, but it turns out that 
Uber also substitutes for some public transport offerings, 
at least in some cities and countries. Uber cars use public 
infrastructures, such as roads and highways. Figure 2 illus-
trates the “Uber phenomenon”:
DRIVER UBER CUSTOMER
ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE
Figure 2. The “UBER phenomenon”
Source: Author’s own compilation
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Roads and highways are public infrastructures; that is, 
they are paid for mostly by taxpayers. Two public policy 
issues of digital platforms as applied to infrastructures can 
be highlighted here, the first is financial and the second is 
political:
1. The financial issue: Road and highway infrastruc-
tures’ investments and maintenance are mainly paid for by 
the taxpayers. Private cars contribute to a certain extent 
through all kind of taxes (vehicle tax, fuel tax, etc.), while 
taxis also contribute by way of license fees. While private 
car owners typically pay at the national level, taxis mainly 
pay to the city authorities. A typical private car is used ap-
proximately one out of every 24 hours by approximately 
one or two passengers. The business case of UBER is to 
better use the asset (that is, the car) significantly more than 
a private driver would (even though it still qualifies as a pri-
vate car). While fuel tax is proportionate to usage, vehicle 
tax typically is not. In other words, Uber gets a good deal. 
It gets an even better deal considering that it does not, as is 
the case in most cities, pay a license fee. In short, Uber cars 
use infrastructures disproportionately more while paying 
less. Consequently, the difference is paid by the taxpayer, 
who, so-to-speak, subsidizes Uber. This is clearly a public 
policy issue.
2. The political issue: It is well known that Uber, at least 
in some cities, induces more traffic. People who would not 
otherwise travel make a quick Uber trip and add to CO2 
emissions, congestion, pollution, and noise. These are all 
externalities for which Uber and its customers do not pay, 
although this is also the case with private car users. CO2 
emissions, pollution, noise, and congestion have recently 
become political issues and public authorities, especially in 
cities, are actively trying to reduce car usage. Should this 
also apply to Uber usage, especially if Uber can take advan-
tage of less crowded roads. Such is the political (public pol-
icy) question that Uber as a platform, and for that matter 
all other platforms that use public infrastructures, raises.
Both of the above issues are problematic, but can be 
solved by way of regulation, provided that there is political 
will. From a technical regulatory point of view, however, 
such regulation is not too difficult to implement. To solve 
both the financial and the political issues, Uber licenses 
could incorporate the disproportionate use of the public 
road infrastructure, as they could incorporate the external-
ities that Uber cars cause. The remaining question, then, is 
whether Uber still has a business model once all external-
ities are fully internalized, but this is a different question.
MaaS 
I will now go one step further by discussing MaaS plat-
forms, which illustrate a third issue, namely a policy issue, 
in which algorithms play a crucial role. 
MaaS platforms are a step beyond ride-sharing platforms. 
They not only aggregate ride-hailing providers, but they 
also include public transport offerings from trains, metros, 
trams, buses, as well as car rentals, bike-sharing offerings, 
even parking and potentially many other things. As with 
Uber, customers use an app when booking a ride, except 
that in the case of MaaS platforms such rides can include 
any combination of transport modes so as to get from A to 
B in the quickest, most efficient, cheapest or most ecolog-
ical way. MaaS platforms are private undertakings and will 
therefore optimize revenue for themselves, while trying to 
satisfy customers. Figure 3 illustrates how MaaS platforms 
work. 
MaaS platforms of course display the same issue as Uber 
platforms when it comes to finances, but this time the 
issue is further exacerbated. Not only are physical infra-
structures used by the private platforms who do not pay 
for investments and maintenance of these infrastructures, 
but the service providers (such as train operating compa-
nies, bus operators, etc.) are also being “commoditized” by 
the platform. This can become a problem because many 
of these service providers are also subsidized by the pub-
CUSTOMERS
MAAS PLATFORM
MOBILITY SERVICES PROVIDERS: 
TRAINS, METROS, TRAMS, BUSES, 
TAXIS, UBERS
INFRASTRUCTURES: ROAD, RAIL ,etc.
Figure 3. The workings of MaaS platforms
Source: Author’s own compilation
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lic authorities to various extents. Also, as platforms take a 
margin in-between the service providers and the customer, 
this amounts to the taxpayer subsidizing private platforms.
However, MaaS platforms illustrate yet another issue: the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of making public policy. 
Infrastructures, especially infrastructure services provision, 
ultimately serve public policy, and not just simply market 
objectives. Infrastructures – or what is now called “foun-
dational infrastructures” – create the very conditions for 
societies to develop and must be treated as such. This is 
the case of energy, transport, communications and water 
infrastructures, in which the public authorities invest – 
and which public authorities sometimes operate – so that 
citizens have access to basic (and sophisticated) transport, 
energy, water, and communications services, and thanks 
to which business can develop their commercial activities. 
If such infrastructures do not perform, are not well main-
tained, or are just not sufficiently developed, this will be 
detrimental to social welfare. When private digital plat-
forms start to overlay such public service infrastructures, 
this raises a public policy issue.
3. The public policy issue: Such a public policy issue aris-
es because digital platforms – and especially their underly-
ing algorithms – interfere in, influence, and probably even 
“make” public policy. In the case of MaaS, the platform 
will suggest the cheapest, fastest, most reliable, most eco-
logical, etc., route to get from A to B, while at the same 
time seeking to optimize its own revenue. For example, a 
train ride may be more ecological than a bus ride, but it 
may take a few minutes more; similarly, an Uber ride may 
be faster than a metro ride, but the MaaS platform may 
get a better deal with the metro service provider. In any 
case, MaaS platforms – like any other digital platform for 
that matter – will influence, if not determine consumer 
choices. These choices will be programmed into the algo-
rithms that suggest or even select the mobility options for 
the users. What is programmed into these algorithms will 
remain non-transparent, as these algorithms constitute the 
very competitive advantage of the MaaS platform, not to 
mention that they are at the heart of the MaaS platform’s 
business model. I will discuss the difficulties to regulate al-
gorithms and such platforms in the next section. My argu-
ment here is that platforms and their underlying algorithms 
do not need to be regulated for the sake of regulating, but 
because they interfere with public policies. For example, if 
a national, regional, or local government wants to promote 
public transport over private transport (because it aims to 
reduce CO2 emissions, while the MaaS platform systemat-
ically offers the cheapest and most CO2-intensive route), 
public policy-makers will find it difficult, if not impossible 
to implement their policy. This creates the question of how 
to regulate digital platforms in their role as policy-makers.
Regulating platforms in public policy-relevant infra-
structures
To recall, in the case of public policy-relevant infrastruc-
tures – which are typically the case in transport, energy, 
water and communications, but also in health care and 
education – digital platforms do influence user behavior 
and thus affect public policy. This is done thanks to their 
underlying algorithms, which in turn have been trained 
thanks to data. The ensuing regulatory questions are there-
fore as follows: (1) should such algorithms (and such plat-
forms for that matter) be regulated so that they come in 
line with public policy objectives? (2) Can such algorithms 
be regulated? And (3) how can digital platforms in infra-
structures be regulated, considering that their underlying 
algorithms constitute their very competitive advantage? 
Would there be ways to bring digital infrastructure plat-
forms in line with public policy objectives, other than reg-
ulating their underlying algorithms? Let me address each 
of these questions separately:
1. Should digital platforms in infrastructures be regulat-
ed? It is obvious that digital platforms in infrastructures 
do and increasingly will interfere with existing or planned 
public policies. Therefore, it goes without saying that these 
platforms, and especially their underlying algorithms, 
should be brought in line with these public policy objec-
tives, such as less fossil-fuel-intensive transport or energy 
consumption modes. The question is not whether they 
should be “regulated”, but whether they can be regulated.
2. The next question is whether such platforms can be 
regulated, given that they are typically global, where-
as public policies are national, regional, and even local; 
and also given that these digital platforms’ competitive 
advantage resides in their algorithms, which are by defi-
nition a commercial asset of these very digital platforms. 
Such regulation would either require to make algorithms 
transparent – for example, an “open algorithm” following 
the “open data” idea – or force the platform providers to 
align their commercial objectives with the public policy 
objectives as much as possible, while letting them free to 
program their algorithms to their commercial advantage. 
Despite being suboptimal, the latter is, in my opinion, the 
only viable option. 
3. Consequently, they only viable way may be for public 
authorities to give licenses (that is, authorizations) to op-
erate to digital infrastructure platform operators, and write 
public service requirements into such licenses. Should this 
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be done at EU or at national levels? Can this be done at 
metropolitan or city level? In any case, the “regulatory 
power” of the public authorities would thus be reduced 
to supervising the compliance by the digital platform pro-
viders with the license requirements. Again, should such 
compliance be monitored at the national, regional, or local 
levels?
This is the current state of my thinking about regulating 
digital infrastructure platforms’ public services dimension.
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Regulation of Digital Platforms: A Survey of the Economic 
Literature
Shourjo Chakravorty*
This article reviews some of the notable economic studies on the regulation of digital platforms. I examine how economists view 
digital platforms as digital markets with an intermediary platform and then consider some studies that discuss the general 
challenges in regulating digital platforms. I conclude by looking at two papers that study specific issues in the regulation of 
digital platform in the net neutrality debate and the correct classification of workers that offer their services via online platforms.
Introduction
Some of the most pressing questions in regulation today – 
whether regarding the net neutrality debate or the correct 
classification of Uber drivers as independent contractors or 
employees – are related to digital platforms. This is unsur-
prising considering the growth of the use of digital plat-
forms in our economic lives over the last two decades. This 
growth has been facilitated by the development of Internet 
and communications technology (ICT) during the same 
time period. We now use digital platforms for communica-
tion (for example, WhatsApp and Skype), travel (for exam-
ple, Expedia), transportation (for example, Uber and Lyft), 
shopping (for example, Amazon), entertainment (for ex-
ample, Netflix), accommodation (for example, Airbnb), 
and may even depend on such platforms for such essential 
services as electricity in the future.
Although not a comprehensive survey, in this article I 
discuss the economic studies on the regulation of digital 
platforms that I feel are some of the most relevant. The 
remainder of the article is arranged as follows. The second 
section explains how economists view digital platforms; 
the third section reviews papers on the regulation of digital 
regulation in general; the fourth section examines papers 
on digital platform regulation in specific sectors of the 
economy; and the fifth section concludes.
Digital platforms in economics
For identification purposes, the definition of a digital 
platform is of primary importance to regulators and com-
petition authorities. However, there is no single agreed 
definition of digital platforms among economists despite 
the existing high-quality research in this area. Spulber 
(2018) argued that platforms are nothing more than digi-
tal markets, which suggests that the economics of markets 
and the economics of platforms are the same. Traditional 
economics has focused on production rather than transac-
tions in the marketplace, but the immense success of on-
line marketplaces such as Amazon and eBay and the online 
facilitation of the sharing economy such as Uber and Air-
bnb have encouraged the study the role of intermediaries 
in the market. According to Spulber (2018), the follow-
ing terms have sufficient overlap to be treated equivalently 
in economic analysis: markets, platforms, intermediaries, 
market makers and match makers, market microstructure, 
organized exchanges, multi-sided markets, multi-sided 
networks, sharing economy and peer-to-peer markets, and 
ecosystems. Spulber called for a common terminology so 
that economic researchers can coordinate their research 
and avoid duplication of results.
With the increase in e-commerce since the beginning of 
the century, there have been a number of studies on the 
economics of platforms. The three seminal works in this 
area have been Rochet and Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jul-
lien (2003), and Armstrong (2006). All three theoretical 
analyses investigate the determinants of the prices charged 
by a platform to the two sides of the market they are in-
termediating. This provides an indication of where econ-
omists, especially those in the field of industrial organiza-
tion, have focused their interest. It is, of course, important 
for regulators to understand how digital platforms set their 
prices if they are to be effectively regulated.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) derived pricing structures for a 
two-sided market with network externalities for a variety 
of different economic environments. The authors mod-
eled a platform on which economic value is created when 
two sides of the market who are the end users of the plat-
form – buyers and sellers – complete a transaction on the 
platform. Buyers and sellers are heterogeneous, and each 
agent’s surplus increases with the total number of agents 
on the other side of the market. Rochet and Tirole derived 
pricing formulae that the platform would implement for its 
usage on the two sides of market under different circum-
stances, including if the platform is a private monopoly, a 
social-welfare maximizer, competes with another platform, 
has buyers with linear demands, has buyers and sellers who 
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can transact on multiple platforms (multihome), and can 
charge a fixed usage fee along with the price it charges per 
transaction.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) analyzed a market in which 
there are two sides of a market that want to transact with 
each other, but have zero probability of matching unless 
they use an informational intermediary. Like Rochet and 
Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jullien found that indirect 
network effects are present in the model in which each 
member of one side of the market benefits from using the 
intermediary if there are members on the other side of the 
market also using the intermediary on the other side of the 
market. This is because this increases the probability of a 
match for each member. The authors claimed that this is a 
representation of an e-commerce market. However, unlike 
Rochet and Tirole (2003), the populations on either side of 
the markets are homogeneous and the authors modeled the 
matching process explicitly. Caillaud and Jullien modeled 
two intermediary platforms that compete on price. One of 
the platforms is an established platform or an incumbent 
and the other is a new entrant. Caillaud and Jullien derived 
equilibria for a number of different cases, including when 
users can multihome and platforms cannot use transaction 
fees but have to rely on a single fixed registration fee. In 
all cases, the authors found that there always exist efficient 
equilibria, but that an inefficient equilibrium may exist in 
the multihoming case. This is important for regulators to 
know and identify because the main economic objective 
of the regulator is to maximize total welfare, which only 
occurs in efficient equilibria. An interesting result of Cail-
laud and Jullien (2003) is that when users can only use one 
platform (singlehome), the platforms’ profits are eroded 
by price competition as both try to capture the monopoly 
position. When multihoming is allowed, the platforms are 
able to avoid fierce price competition, leading to positive 
profits in equilibrium. Hence, it is possible that multihom-
ing and the equilibrium in which platforms make a posi-
tive profit may not be an efficient equilibrium.
Armstrong (2006) also studied competing intermediary 
platforms that serve two sides of a market in which net-
work externalities are present. He found that the price a 
platform charges to one side of the market is determined 
by how much the benefit the other side obtains from the 
presence of that side of the market. For example, some 
nightclubs grant free admission to women not because 
of the benefit (or lack of ) that women enjoy from going 
to the nightclub, but because a larger female clientele in-
creases the attractiveness of the nightclub to men. There-
fore, to compete effectively on one side of the market, the 
firm needs to perform well on the other side. This leads to 
downward pressure on prices on both sides of the market 
in comparison to the case in which positive externalities 
are absent. Consequently, platforms have an incentive to 
decrease network effects. Another interesting finding by 
Armstrong is that if one side of the market singlehomes 
and the other side multihomes, then the multihoming side 
is forced to deal with the singlehoming agent’s chosen plat-
form if it wants to interact with the agent. The platform 
becomes a monopolist in granting access to the singlehom-
ing agents that choose to use it. In the case of a monopoly 
platform, this leads to high prices on the multihoming side 
which, in turn, leads to fewer agents being served on this 
side compared to the efficient outcome. When there are 
competing platforms, the profits earned from the multi-
homing side are largely dissipated in the low prices offered 
to the singlehoming side in order to attract them. 
There has been substantial theoretical literature on inter-
mediary platforms and two-sided markets following the 
three abovementioned papers. However, only a few studies 
have dealt directly with the question of the regulation of 
digital platforms. I discuss some of these studies in the next 
subsection.
General regulation of digital platforms
In this section, I discuss two studies that directly address 
the problems of regulating digital problems, and one study 
that sheds light on one of these problems.
 Einav et al. (2016) analyzed peer-to-peer markets such as 
eBay, Uber, and Airbnb that allow small suppliers to com-
pete with the traditional sellers of these goods and services. 
In their theoretical model, they found that, with a decline 
in fixed costs such as advertising and visibility allowed by 
the Internet, the capacity of small sellers may crowd out 
the dedicated capacity of traditional sellers. For example, 
the entry of small sellers of rental accommodation via Air-
bnb may cause Hilton to decrease its future investments. 
Einav et al. examined the main problems regulators face 
concerning digital peer-to-peer markets without offering 
any solutions. The first problem they cited is entry and li-
censing standards, whereby businesses such as Airbnb and 
Uber have managed to enter local markets by being able 
to dodge local regulations. Economically, escaping licens-
ing may decrease welfare because licensing corrects market 
failures such as unlicensed taxi drivers operating unsafe ve-
hicles. Conversely, licensing may only serve the interests of 
the incumbent operators such as taxi medallions that re-
strict entry into the taxi market (Stigler 1971). Hence, the 
entry of unlicensed new players may increase welfare. The 
second problem the authors noted is the use of contrac-
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tors rather than employees that characterize peer-to-peer 
businesses. On one hand, some workers may value flexible 
working hours and demand variability may also favor this 
type of existing arrangement. On the other hand, market 
forces may not sufficiently protect workers and employ-
ment regulations are necessary. The third problem con-
cerns data and privacy regulation. Peer-to-peer business 
collect data on their users for matching purposes, setting 
prices, and monitoring behavior. The question of which 
rights consumers and platforms should have regarding data 
is only partly an economic one. Nevertheless, Einav et al. 
believed that economic analysis is warranted in examin-
ing the role of regulating the sharing and use of individual 
user data. The last issue observed by those authors, which 
has not garnered much attention, is the question of when 
to regulate. A characteristic of a peer-to-peer business is 
that if it is initially successful, it grows exceedingly fast. 
Because regulations are difficult to change once they have 
been legislated, it may be wise to take a “lenient early-stage 
approach to regulation”(Einav et al. 2016). This is because 
a peer-to-peer business may transform into a very different 
organization than when it started, and early regulations 
may become ineffective or unreasonable. However, if reg-
ulators wait until a business has expanded, then later reg-
ulation may become a long and huge undertaking, given 
the large size of the business. An example of this is Europe’s 
intended antitrust action against Google.
Montero and Finger (2017) were concerned with the con-
sequences of digital platforms disrupting traditional net-
work industries with physical assets such as the communi-
cations, transport, and energy industries. They argued that 
digital platforms disrupt traditional network industries in 
two ways: substitution and commoditization. Firstly, digi-
tal platforms such as Uber substitute for traditional indus-
tries such as the taxi industry. Secondly, commoditization 
entails the online platform obtaining a substantial share 
of the transaction’s value from one side of the market. For 
example, Skype provides voice over the Internet (VoIP) us-
ing the infrastructure provided by traditional telecommu-
nications providers. The authors fear that these disruptions 
will cause underinvestment in network infrastructure by 
traditional service providers, which online platforms also 
rely on for the provision of their services. Montero and 
Finger then examined regulations in the communications, 
transport, and energy industries in this context.
One theoretical analysis that tries to examine investment 
by intermediaries was Spulber (2002), whose model was 
based on the business-to-business market. In Spulber’s 
model, buyers and sellers undertake complementary in-
vestments in their businesses. His main finding is that 
investment levels are efficient when there are two compet-
ing intermediaries in comparison to microstructures (1) 
in which there is no intermediary and buyers and sellers 
match randomly, (2) when there is a monopolistic inter-
mediary and (3) when there is a simultaneous market of 
random matching and a monopolistic intermediary. 
Digital platform regulation in specific sectors
I finish my discussion by mentioning two papers that in-
vestigate two single questions in the regulation of digital 
platforms in two specific sectors.
I believe that no particular issue has been more debated 
concerning digital platform regulation than net neutral-
ity. The net neutrality debate is the question of whether 
Internet service providers (ISPs) should be able to price 
discriminate by charging content providers (CPs) higher 
prices for preferential access to broadband transmission 
service. One notable theoretical study on the net neutral-
ity debate is Choi and Kim (2010). Choi and Kim stud-
ied the investment incentives of ISPs and CPs in the net 
neutrality debate. ISPs such as Verizon and AT&T oppose 
net neutrality regulations because they argue such regula-
tions decrease their incentive to invest in network capac-
ity. This occurs because such regulations mean that CPs 
supporting bandwidth-intensive multimedia applications 
will be charged the same price as CPs, causing less Internet 
traffic. The proponents of net neutrality (mainly large CPs 
such as Google and Yahoo and consumer rights groups) 
argue discriminatory pricing will stifle content innovation. 
Choi and Kim found that the direction of the relationship 
between net neutrality and the investments incentives of 
ISPs and CPs is not unambiguous. For example, capacity 
expansion of the network that speeds up delivery content 
of all CPs will decrease the value of preferential access (and 
hence, the price the ISP can charge for it) in a discrimina-
tory regime. Thus, an ISP’s incentive to invest in capacity 
may be lower in such a regime than a regime in which it is 
forced to charge the same price to all CPs.  
An interesting theoretical study is Hagiu and Wright 
(2018), which questioned whether workers that provide 
their services through online platforms such as Handy 
and Uber should be considered as independent contrac-
tors or employees. This is, to my knowledge, the first 
formal economic analysis on the welfare implications of 
the classification (and misclassification) of workers in the 
sharing economy. An interesting finding of theirs is that, 
in some situations, an intermediate classification between 
independent contractor and employee in which case the 
firm controls some of the actions of the worker while the 
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worker retains control of the remaining actions may be 
welfare-maximizing.
Concluding remarks
Although this has not been a comprehensive survey, it 
should be clear that legislators and regulators are faced with 
myriad new challenges in the regulation of digital plat-
forms in general, as well as in specific sectors of the econo-
my. With technology progressing in leaps and bounds as it 
has been for the last two decades, these challenges are pre-
dicted to increase. Compared to these growing challenges, 
there has been a dearth of economic research in this field. 
Hopefully, this will change in future, with more economic 
theoretical and empirical research on this subject, which is 
so desperately needed to guide regulatory policy.
References
Armstrong, M. (2006), ‘Competition in two-sided mar-
kets’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 668–691.
Caillaud, B., and Jullien, B. (2003), ‘Chicken and egg: 
competition among intermediation service providers’, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2): 309–328.
Choi, J., P., and Kim, B. (2010), ‘Net neutrality and 
investment incentives’, The RAND Journal of Economics, 
41(3): 446–471.
Einav, L., Farronato, C., and Levin, J. (2016), ‘Peer-to-
peer markets’, Annual Review of Economics, 31(8): 615–
635.
Hagiu, A., and Wright, J. (2018). ‘The status of workers 
and platforms in the sharing economy’, Journal of Econom-
ics and Management Strategy, 28(1): 97–108.
Montero, J. J., and Finger, M. (2017), ‘Platformed! Net-
work industries and the new digital paradigm’, Competition 
and Regulation in Network Industries, 18(3–4): 217–239.
Rochet, J., and Tirole J. (2003), ‘Platform competition 
in two-sided markets’, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 1(4): 990–1029.
Spulber, D. F. (2002), ‘Market microstructure and in-
centives to invest’, Journal of Political Economy, 110(2): 
352–381.
Spulber, D. F. (2018), ‘The economics of markets and 
platforms’, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 
28(1): 1–14.
Stigler, G. (1971), ‘The theory of economic regulation’, 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1): 
3–21.
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 21 | N°4 | December 2019              18
dossierannouncements
SUBMIT YOUR ABSTRACT BY 
3 FEBRUARY  2020
The Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures is the annual 
event that brings together all the Areas of the Florence School of 
Regulation. The 9th edition of the Conference on the Regulation of 
Infrastructures will focus on ‘Sector Coupling’ and will take place on 
25-26th June 2020 in Florence.
Learn more about the 8th edition of the conference, which took place 
in Florence on June 20 and 21 2019 here.
Submit here
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Manifesto for the next five years of EU regulation of Transport
An FSR-Transport Vision for Advancing the Single European Transport Area by turning the 
Challenges of Decarbonisation and Digital isation into Opportunities
Read the full publication here. 
Summary 
The recent renewal of the European institutions 
and the election of a new College of European 
Commissioners offers an opportunity for European 
regulation. While the new institutional composition 
will be in place for the next five years (2019–2024), 
the legislative and public-spending decisions 
made under the von der Leyen Commission will 
have implications for decades to come in terms 
of shaping the direction of the European transport 
sector.  
The hallmark and the very identity of the EU is 
the creation of a Single European Market. Over 
the past 35 years the European Commission has 
endeavored to further the mobility of goods and 
people in Europe by removing national barriers, by 
harmonising technical and operational standards 
and by creating competition in air transport, 
railways, roads, and waterborne transport. This 
has been done mostly by way of a sector-specific 
approach, an approach which today however 
reaches its limitations, as mobility – both for 
passengers and freight – increasingly becomes 
multimodal. While the last Commission, and 
especially the outgoing Transport Commissioner 
Violeta Bulc, identified multimodality as the new 
frontier and challenge of promoting a Single 
European Transport market, the sector-specific approach still prevails and remains engrained in the institutional 
setup in both the market and its regulation, as well as in the organisation of the Commission itself.
While the completion of the Single European Transport Area continues to be work in progress, new global 
challenges – namely climate change and digitalisation – are exerting additional pressure, but also offer new 
opportunities for the European transport sector. 
Climate change is set to be a central pillar of the next Commission mandate. Having pledged to deliver a 
‘Green Deal’ for Europe in the course of her first 100 days in office, Commission President-elect von der 
Leyen reaffirmed her commitment to making Europe the world’s first climate-neutral continent by enshrining 
the 2050 objective into law. Achieving this goal will require vast transformations across all sectors of the 
economy, including transport. 
Digitalisation, on the other hand, is adding a new layer of complexity onto transport; yet, if carefully regulated, 
it has the potential to advance EU sustainability objectives, while at the same time increasing efficiency, 
enabling smoother and more customer-oriented operations and, not least, enhancing safety. 
This Manifesto shares our vision for how to further the Single European transportation area for goods and 
people by turning the challenges of smart transport and sustainability into new opportunities for efficiency 
and competitive services.
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 22, issue 
1, 2020 (March)
“Governance of Large Urban Water Sys-
tems”
Presentation of the next issue
In this issue we want to explore a new and increas-
ingly urgent topic, namely the question of how to 
govern metropolitan water systems. We would like to 
cover both the governance of the water resource, and 
the water cycle for that matter, and the governance 
of drinking and wastewater provision. Most of the 
world’s metropolitan areas have grown and continue 
to grow rapidly, a process that goes hand in hand 
with growing water consumption, leading often to 
falling water tables and degraded groundwater qual-
ity, thus leading to the need to source water from 
ever further away, i.e., from jurisdictions not covered 
by metropolitan governance mechanisms. Similarly, 
metropolitan areas, because of their growth, come to 
encompass water distribution and wastewater man-
agement systems falling under different jurisdictions 
and operated by different companies. 
Should you be willing to submit your contribution 
for this issue, please contact Prof. Matthias Finger  
(matthias.finger@epfl.ch).
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Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
The Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
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